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Brazil has not only experienced a new and relatively high growth cycle but also several 
corruption scandals occurring one after another since the end of the military rule in 
1985. As a result of both internal and external demands, the country has implemented a 
new set of anti-corruption norms, procedures and punishments mainly in the Federal 
sphere. However, these efforts do not necessarily mean less corruption in the short term, 
nor increased accountability.	
 This paper looks at the Brazilian legal instrument that makes companies strictly 
liable for domestic and international corrupt acts and provides civil and administrative 
sanctions such as monetary fines and widespread announcements of any condemnatory 
decision through the Brazilian Clean Company Act (Law 12846/2013). The aim here is to 
question the extent to which Brazil complies with international anti-corruption 
legislation by analysing the domestic implementation and enforcement of its new Clean 
Company Act (CCA).	
 The Brazilian Act was dubbed an ‘Anti-Corruption Law’ despite the fact that the 
word ‘corruption’ appears in its text only once when it quotes the name of OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (1997). In the Portuguese translation, the word ‘bribery’ was changed to 
‘corruption’. Indeed, the Brazilian Law expanded its concept of bribery, referring to it 
generally as ‘acts against the public administration, national or foreign’. The written 
Law, in Chapter 2, also lists five specific topics to frame the legal concept of corruption, 
which includes offers, promises, or actual giving of any undue pecuniary or other 
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advantage as well as financing illegal acts and hindering or interfering with 
investigations. The Act was put into force to guarantee administrative punishment for 
companies that are involved in domestic and international bribery. Thus, its focus is on 
corporations, not individuals (De Figueiredo 2016).	
 The data used here includes all the versions of the bill as well as messages and 
reports signed by politicians explaining how the Law was designed and changed. 
Campaign financing records, especially donations made by companies that are, since the 
beginning of 2014, under investigation in a massive corruption scandal, are also used in 
this paper. These data help to explain how Brazil put into force Law 12846/2013 and 
might also be seen as evidence to support the concept of ‘convenient accountability’, 
which is introduced here as the main framework to understand this case study.	
 Accountability by definition carries out two main connotations that embrace the 
efforts of exercising power: answerability and enforcement (Schedler 1999). Indeed, it 
needs both the obligation of public officials – politicians and civil servants – to explain 
and report what and why they are doing as well as the capacity of public agencies which 
impose sanctions on rulers, enforcers or powerholders who misused the public office for 
private gains. However, accountability is still considered as a relatively ‘underexplored 
concept whose meaning remains evasive, whose boundaries are fuzzy, and whose 
internal structure is confusing’ (Schedler 1999:13). Here, there is room to explore its 
different facets.	
 According to O’Donnell (1998, 1999), accountability runs not only vertically, 
‘making elected officials answerable to the ballot box’ as well as controlled by the media 
and civil society as a whole, but also horizontally, across a network of state agencies and 
institutions that ‘can call into question, and eventually punish, improper ways of 
discharging the responsibilities of a given office’ (O'Donnell 1999: 165). However, at the 
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same time, both horizontal and vertical accountability can be limited or even inefficient. 
It happens – sometimes deliberately and entirely for convenience depending on the 
enforcer – with the development of less risky and less costly horizontal checks and 
balances systems in order to attend different demands and pressures.	
 In other words, anti-corruption mechanisms can be conveniently designed and 
enforced to fit different kinds of demands from both those who want and do not want 
greater accountability. The concept of rationality implies, to some extent, conscious 
reactions not only to commit a criminal or corrupt act but to also prevent it. The main 
argument of this paper is that when calculating costs and benefits, enforcers might often 
choose the ‘convenient accountability’ to keep a certain balance to abstain from 
‘whatever it costs’ behaviour, which is potentially damaging for politicians in office.	
 In the first section of this paper, the process to design and put into force the new 
piece of legislation against international and domestic bribery that took around 15 years 
to establish in Brazil will be presented. This process culminated in the publication of 
enforcement guidelines in March 2015 and in the issue of the provisional Executive 
Order No. 7031 in December 2015 reviewing some important topics, especially to attend 
part of the demand coming from the prosecutor service and the account court as well as 
corporations.	
The role of external drivers within this process, such as people on the streets in 
massive anti-corruption demonstrations, the media covering a different range of 
corruption scandals as well as the major government contractors and campaign donors 
who can be potential targets of this Law acting on the backstage will also be explored. 
The second section briefly compares the Brazilian Act with the main provisions of the 
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) main guidelines in 
order to answer whether Brazil follows international patterns. Finally, and before final 
thoughts on how Brazil could better enforce its anti-corruption law, it will be discussed 
whether there is enough evidence to suggest that the concept of ‘convenient 
accountability’ fits to explain this process as well as to put the Brazilian CCA into 
practice.	
 Few scholars from Political and Social Sciences have written about this new 
legislation, which has left the most robust analysis until now to practitioners, especially 
those in the field of Law who have been discussing the concept of automatic and 
objective responsibility (Magalhães 2013; Bottini and Tamasauskas 2014; Nascimento 
2014), or those comparing the main points of the Brazilian CCA with the UK Bribery Act 
as well as the US FCPA or even the OECD Convention (Levine et al 2013; Zaheer 2014). 
This paper may fill in this gap not only by pointing out the major provisions and 
achievements of this new Brazilian Law but also by shedding light onto the importance 
and nuances of its process through the eyes of Political and Social Sciences.	
 In sum, this paper shows that the way anti-corruption laws are designed and put 
into force might affect their enforcement, especially in countries such as Brazil where 
‘convenient accountability’ applies in certain circumstances; or, in other words, where 
political will is affected by the inevitable pressure of those who do not want greater 
control mechanisms. Hence, understanding how accountability is imposed could be 
very useful in the process of enhancing accountability.	
 
Step by step: Being pushed by external drivers	
 
The backbone of the process of creating and putting the Brazilian CCA into force can be 
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compared to one of the laws of motion, more precisely to Newton’s Third Law: ‘For 
every action there must be an equal and opposite reaction’ (Newton 1999:19). The 
Brazilian legislators were, to some extent, pushed forwards and backwards during the 
whole process. The ‘anti-corruption law’ timeline therefore helps to visualize this 
tension among different kinds of demands provoking action-reaction behaviour from 
2000 until now.	
 Although it took 15 years for Brazil to design, enact and put into effect its anti-
international bribery law, there is evidence that every single step forward within this 
process was pushed by a strong claim from the international anti-corruption 
organizations as much as the national civil society and, sometimes, even by specific 
corruption scandals intensively covered by the national media. At the same time, the 
apparent lack of rush in improving this piece of anti-corruption legislation may be 
connected to the demands from those who do not want greater accountability, especially 
the potential targets of this Law - companies who are massive campaign financers and 
governmental contractors.	
 In 2000, Brazil signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which was enacted three years 
before. Even as one of the non-OECD members, Brazil committed to ensuring that its 
national parliament approve the Convention and pass legislation necessary for its 
ratification and implementation into national law. For almost ten years, however, 
nothing in this direction has been made and the OECD had criticized Brazil for not 
holding corporate entities liable for corrupt conduct. After the UK Anti Bribery Act 
(2010), Brazil lost its excuse that even developed countries had not passed a similar 
statute.	
 Before designing its CCA, it is important to point out that Brazil first included 
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new provisions on its Penal Code to punish private parties in cases of crimes against 
public administration as well as changed some points of a specific law against money 
laundering. Notwithstanding, it was not considered enough by the international anti-
corruption community. It was only in February 2010, under intense international 
pressures (Nascimento 2014), mainly from the OECD, that the Federal Executive branch 
finally sent its first version of the CCA to be analysed and voted by its National 
Congress2. Among the reasons listed in the statement that was sent to the Congress, the 
federal Execute highlighted not only the gap in the Brazilian legislation to punish 
companies involved in international corruption cases but also the necessity to cooperate 
with the OECD Convention as well as the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (2005) and the Inter-America Convention Against Corruption (1996)3.	
 The Brazilian bill was mainly designed by the Comptroller General Office (CGU 
in Portuguese), the internal anti-corruption agency within the Federal Executive branch, 
with the help of the Federal Government Attorney General's Office4 as well as the 
Ministry of Justice. The three ministers of cabinet signed the statement to the National 
Congress stressing that such a piece of legislation be considered ‘urgent’. The heads of 
the Comptroller General Office and the Federal Government Attorney General's Office 
as well as the minister of Justice claimed that civil and administrative punishments were 
better than criminal ones in the case of corporations because they are faster and more 
																																																						
2In Brazil, the Congress has a Chamber of Deputies (lower house with 513 members on four-year terms) and a 
Senate (upper house with 81 members on eight-year terms). Both houses have to approve the same bill text before it 
goes for the presidential enactment. 
 




4In Brazil, the heads of Comptroller General Office and the Federal Attorney General have the status of minister of 
cabinet. 
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efficient. The bill, as well as this message, was sent to Congress eight months before the 
2010 federal elections, when President Lula used his popularity to build up the former 
minister and, to some extent, the political novice, Dilma Rousseff, his successor. If the 
bill was approved on time, it would have been an important campaign flag for boosting 
Dilma’s image. In addition, the bill arrived in Congress at the same moment Brazil was 
experiencing a massive corruption scandal. Hence, the decision to send the bill can be 
seen, in the very least, as good timing to address corruption with stronger measures.	
 At that time, the governor of the Distrito Federal had been accused of leading a 
scheme which consisted of overcharging contracts with private companies in order to 
inject money into political parties and politicians. Mr José Roberto Arruda was the only 
governor affiliated to DEM (an opposing party to the federal administration ran by 
President Lula) and the Federal Police arrested him three days after President Lula 
signed the bill. The case received national media attention because a whistle-blower had 
recorded videos of the exact moment the money was delivered to Arruda's hands as 
well as to the hands of local politicians, businessmen and journalists. Some of them were 
shown hiding the bribery in their underwear, socks and bags. 	
 When the Federal Executive branch designed the anti-corruption law, however, 
the aim was not to react to this specific scandal, although the timing was convenient. 
Lula's administration's main goal was using the company's assets as compensation for 
the damage caused by corrupt acts (Falcão 2010). As the Comptroller General Office 
head chief stated at that time, it was the first time Brazil would have a piece of law to 
support seizing a certain company’s revenue capital to seek compensation for the losses 
actually caused by corruption. In turn, the National Congress pushed a tenfold increase 
in the maximum fine compared to the first version of the bill (De Figueiredo 2016).	
 It was only in May 2011 that the members of the Lower Chamber started to 
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discuss the bill, creating a special commission to organize hearings and to analyse 
suggestions of changes and amendments from both congressional members and 
organized civil society. That month, the president’s right-hand man and Chief of Staff, 
Mr Antonio Palocci, was under attack and under suspicion because of his own revenues. 
The case was brought to the attention of the public eye by the media. When Mr Antonio 
Palocci was a federal congressman, between 2006 and 2010, his personal wealth 
increased 20-fold. Although he said it was a result of consultancy work, he refused to 
give details of who paid him, or for what, on the grounds of client confidentiality. He 
resigned from his position of Chief of Staff after strong media coverage of the case. Until 
today, all the companies who paid him are still unknown. The scandal helped create the 
special commission to analyse the bill.	
 Notwithstanding, it was only in October 2011, five months after its creation, that 
the commission was put into force and a member of the Congress was appointed to 
rewrite the bill. The Brazilian Congress members who were appointed to be part of this 
special commission debated the bill for one year. One member, Mr. Eduardo Cunha, 
who was elected in 2015 as the president of the Lower Chamber by his own peers and 
later suspended by the Supreme Court under corruption accusations, offered a 
substitutive text for the bill in June 2012. After that, no formal step towards its approval, 
or even its rejection, was taken until April 2013.	
 It is important to highlight that 2012 was the year of local elections in all of 
Brazil's 5,567 municipalities5. Besides the fact that some members of Congress 
traditionally run for these elections, most of them have strong political links to 
municipalities in their home states. Candidates must be registered by July 2012 and only 
																																																						
5In 2013 Brazil added three new municipalities. Since then the total is 5.670, according to IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro 
de Geografia e Estatística). 
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then official campaign financing can start for the October elections. In 2012, all 
candidates running for mayor and local council representatives received a total of $0.9bi 
(or 1,867,590,018.37 reais) donated by private companies, most of them traditional 
campaign financers. As Table 1 shows, the top 15 financers, ranked by the total amount 
donated, were responsible for 22.6% of all donations made by companies in the 2012 
elections (Política Aberta 2013) to all candidates from all parties who ran for office that 
year. At least six of these companies are now being investigated in another massive 
corruption scandal in Brazil, as will be discussed.	
 
Table 1 - The 15 biggest companies’ donations during 2012 elections in Brazil 
 





1. CONSTRUTORA ANDRADE GUTIERREZ SA 133 81,165,800 40,786,834.17 
2. CONSTRUTORA QUEIROZ GALVAO S A 107 52,135,000 26,198,492.46 
3. CONSTRUTORA OAS S.A. 153 44,090,000 22,155,778.89 
4. CONSTRUCOES E COMERCIO CAMARGO CORREA 
S/A 
37 32,990,000 16,577,889.44 
5. VALE FERTILIZANTES S.A. 29 30,470,000 15,311,557.78 
6. E.V. TEIXEIRA 1 28,500,009.08 14,321,612.60 
7. BANCO BMG SA 207 24,008,000 12,064,321.60 
8. PRAIAMAR INDUSTRIA COMERCIO & 
DISTRIBUICAO LTDA 
49 22,410,000 11,261,306.5 
9. JBS S/A 25 20,210,000 10,155,778.89 
10. CONSTRUTORA NORBERTO ODEBRECHT 23 19,450,000 9,773,869.34 
11. U T C ENGENHARIA S/A 227 17,973,149 9,031,733.16 
12. CARIOCA CHRISTIANI NIELSEN ENGENHARIA S 
A 
53 15,282,000 7,679,396.98 
13. GALVAO ENGENHARIA S/A 50 11,697,000.08 5,877,889.48 
14. CONTAX S.A. 25 11,495,000 5,776,381.9 
15. BANCO ALVORADA S.A. 38 10,250,000.02 5,150,753.77 
Sources: TSE/Politica Aberta.org (http://www.politicaaberta.org/doadores) 
*Dollar exchange rate in January 2013: US$ 1 = R$ 1.99 
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It was only in April 2013 that the bill started moving around again within Congress. At 
that time, the congressional member in charge of giving the final version of the bill 
formally admitted that companies were pushing for changes6. In one of his reports, 
Carlos Zarattini (Workers Party-São Paulo) stated that 'there was resistance from various 
business sectors' towards the new legal provision regarding joint liabilities. The current 
understanding is that the new legislation allows punishing not only the company that 
allegedly engaged in corruption but also parent, subsidiary, or affiliated companies that 
are part of a same group that benefited from the corrupt act, although the fine will be 
based on the gross revenues of the company to which the corrupt entity or subsidiary is 
directly linked, and not on the revenues of the group as a whole. 
The bill was approved by the special commission and, at the beginning of June 
2013, sent to a permanent commission in order to analyse whether it fit within the 
current Constitution of Brazil and finally, to transform it into Law, although there was 
no previous deadline defined for these steps.	
 In June 2013, however, Brazil saw massive street demonstrations across the 
country. Thousands of people in different cities protested for better services, new laws 
and less corruption in a movement that might be seen as both the expression of 
traditional middle class complaining with several aspects of national reality as well as of 
new proletariats who suffer from low pay, high turnover and poor working conditions 
(Singer 2013). In a clear response to the wave of what was called the ‘June 
demonstrations’, the Brazilian Congress did what it had not done in years in less than 
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one month. The bill passed in the Lower House on June 11th and in the Senate on July 
5th; in the Senate, the processing was even faster. Overall, the bill that had been in the 
Lower House for approximately three years was approved by the Senate in just 16 days.	
 Both international and national demands forced the Senate to approve the new 
legislation. The bill was included on the list prepared by the president of the Senate to 
address part of people’s demands during street protests (Senado 2013). In addition, 
while presenting his report to his peers, Senator Ricardo Ferraço (The Brazilian 
Democratic Movement Party – Espírito Santo) said that the text not only improved the 
Brazilian image in the international arena but also addressed the OECD’s 
recommendations just before its fourth evaluation phase.	
 Also, to respond to people’s demands presented in the street demonstrations, 
President Dilma Rousseff enacted the bill on August 1st. She exercised her authority to 
veto barring three provisions (Zaheer 2014). The major veto regards to the need to prove 
negligence or wilfully corrupt conduct. It deleted any fault or intent requirement from 
the Law for it to be enforced. Therefore, punishment would be applied based on 
evidence, facts and outcomes that any employee’s act has somehow beneficiated the 
company as a consequence of a corrupt act. She also vetoed an item that limited the fine 
to the value of the contract between the company and the public agency and another 
item that took into consideration the extent to which a public official contributed to the 
illegal conduct to define the sanctions.	
 Despite the fact that the CCA was enacted in 2013, it was only put into force in 
January 2014 due the necessity to edit further guidelines. This time gap was used by the 
Comptroller General Office to prepare internal regulations and rules such as how a 
procedure would be conduct or which kind of compliance mechanisms are mandatory 
in order to reduce sanctions. The guidelines were ready in January 2014 but the 
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president of Brazil did not sign this regulation in 2014. Dilma Rousseff, who in 2014 was 
running for re-election, did not issue the decree in that year in order to avoid any doubts 
or courts disputes, even after a corruption investigation involving Petrobras, the biggest 
Brazilian state-controlled company, was opened.	
 In March 2014, Brazil saw the beginning of another huge corruption scandal 
being brought to public attention. Dubbed ‘Car Wash’ (Lava Jato in Portuguese), it is the 
bribery, kickback and federal public money laundering investigation resulting in a rare 
case of effective cooperation between the Federal Police, the Federal Prosecutor Service 
and the Federal Judiciary (De Figueiredo, 2015). The scheme seems to be old-fashion as 
politicians and political parties made it an aim to appoint top Petrobras officials who 
colluded with a cartel of private companies to overcharge contracts for construction and 
service work. The cartel, known as ‘the club’ by its own members, not only decided 
which of its member companies would win a contract but also split part of the oily 
company’s payments with its officials, Congress members and leaders of political 
parties. Part of the money received through the overcharged contracts also went direct 
to political campaigns as legal donations.	
 Lava-Jato main findings have been making newspaper headlines every single day 
and the scope of this investigation is still rapidly expanding. Throughout an 18-month 
span, it has already investigated Petrobras’ contracts and it has sent more than thirty 
executives from Brazil’s top construction firms as well as former or non-elected 
politicians and high rank former civil servants into police custody. In addition, 47 
members of the National Congress are already being investigated by the Supreme 
Court, making the petrolão (the “big oily”) Brazil’s biggest corruption scandal to date (De 
Figueiredo 2015).	
 During 2014, while the task force was investigating well-known companies and 
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arresting their main executives, the brand new ‘anti-corruption law’ was not enforced a 
single time by the Comptroller General Office, who had the ability to either execute 
leniency agreements relating to conduct at federal level or to involve foreign 
governments. Only in December 2014, after several whistle-blowing agreements signed 
by these suspicious companies’ bosses with external anti-corruption agencies, the 
Comptroller General decided to open internal administrative procedures against eight 
constructors. The executive anti-corruption agency awaited Dilma's re-election to start 
investigating the companies and, according to the Electoral Court reports, all made 
massive donations to her campaign.	
 Among the companies whose bosses and executives were being investigated, 
eight of them financed Dilma's re-election campaign and six of them financed the 
opposition candidate who ran against the president during the second round. Both 
candidates received around 98,800,000 reais (approximately $44mi). These companies 
also made donations to other candidates as well as to political parties. The donations 
stopped after November when 24 top executives were arrested, according the Electoral 
Court data available online. During 2014, these companies donated around 45% of all 
the donations reported by the three main and biggest political parties in Brazil (PT, 
PSDB and PMDB). In addition, these same companies are also part of the major 
infrastructure contracts made by federal and local governments. They signed contracts 
that sum over 59 billion reais ($28bi) with Petrobras. Nine of them that were being 
investigated were also paid 11.4 billion reais ($5.6bi) by the Federal Executive branch 
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Figure 1 – Total payments from the Federal Executive branch to companies under 




Sources: Contas Abertas/Portal da Transparência  
 
During the campaign, other candidates made strong critiques against President Dilma 
Rousseff because she allowed space for this and, therefore, did not enforce the 
legislation properly. Even under attack, the president resisted to issue the guidelines 
and, therefore, Brazil was not prepared to properly enforce its CCA. The ‘anti-
corruption law’ had been enacted in January 2014, but the president only issued the 
decree in March 2015 as part of a series of anti-corruption measures to counter the 
increasing number of demonstrations focusing on her administration.	
 At the beginning of 2015, her television speeches were reverberating with the 
noise of clanging pots made by those against her. On the 15th of March, people went 
back to streets to protest against her and her administration. Three days later, Dilma 
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setting guidelines for calculating fines, establishing rules to leniency agreements and 
criteria to Brazilian regulators use the companies’ anti-corruption compliance 
programmes to reduce penalties.	
After the Decree 77, four other guidelines were released by the Comptroller 
General Office, who detailed, for instance, not only the expected systems of internal 
controls but also all the steps to open a procedure and investigate companies as well as 
what the Federal government understands as gross revenues. In December 2015, a 
provisional Executive Order (MP 703) amended the Law and provided, among other 
things, a relief to companies signing leniency agreements in corruption cases all the 
while allowing them to pursue contracts with public administration. The Executive 
claimed8 that the proposed changes were necessary to facilitate quicker administrative 
procedures, to foster economic activity, and to preserve jobs. At the same time, it made 
the sanctions less severe and it included other actors such as the account court and the 
prosecutor service as enforcers. 
 This 15-year ‘anti-corruption law’ process has received extensive media coverage 
questioning its slow progression as well as the content of the main provisions 
introduced by this new law. Current procedures that have opened against companies 
already under investigation by external anti-corruption agencies have also received 
attention. The media has also explored companies’ suspicious relationships with 
politicians as financers or governmental contractors. And yet, no company has been 
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punished, although there are 29 of them being preliminarily investigated and five 
leniency agreements requests addressed to the Comptroller General Office.	
 The Judiciary in this Lava-Jato case is convicting and applying criminal sanctions 
against businessmen at a faster rate than the Federal Executive branch and its 
administrative fines against their companies, contrary to the main efficiency argument 
which sustains that the Brazilian Act should only adopt only civil sanctions against 
corrupt companies. Therefore, it remains the question whether the ‘anti-corruption law’ 
needs another external push to bring out the first charges and sanctions, especially 
against those who are already being investigated by other anti-corruption agencies.	
 
Main provisions: Following international patterns except on enforcement	
 	
Fifteen years after signing the OECD Convention, Brazil is struggling to enforce a legal 
instrument that makes companies strictly liable for acts of corruption (both domestic 
and foreign) and bid-rigging practised by their employees and agents. Although the 
Brazilian Clean Company Act was designed based on the main provisions of the UK 
Bribery Act and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the Brazilian text only 
provides strict civil and administrative penalties but no criminal sanctions for 
companies as the OECD suggests and as the other two acts do as well. Therefore, 
imprisonment as a penalty is not expected for Brazil even though it will be enforcing 
this specific legislation.	
 Nevertheless, a brief comparison among the main provisions of the Brazilian, the 
UK and the US acts shows a similar conclusion previously pointed out by Zaheer (2014), 
who compared Law 12846/2013 with OECD Convention requirements. ‘The Brazilian 
Law either meets or exceeds’ the core international patterns, ‘except those on 
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enforcement’ (Zaheer 2014:18). Table 2 below compares 17 topics of FCPA, UK Bribery 
Act and the Brazilian CCA 
 
Table 2 – Main provisions of FCPA, UK Bribery Act and the Brazilian Clean Company Act 
 
Main provisions FCPA  UK Bribery Act  
Brazilian Clean Company 
Act 
Offence to bribe 
foreign (public) 
officials 
Yes Yes Yes 
Offence to bribe 
national (public) 
officials 
No Yes Yes 
Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction  
Yes Yes Yes 
Targets (Jurisdiction) 
U.S. companies and 
citizens, foreign 
companies listed on 
U.S. stock exchange, or 
any person acting 
while in the U.S. 
Individuals who are UK 
nationals or are 
ordinarily resident in 
the UK and 
organizations that are 
either established in the 
UK or conduct some 
part of their business in 
the UK 
Corporations, partnerships, 
and proprietorships, both 
for-profit and non-profit. It 
also subjects to its terms 
non-Brazilian legal entities 
that operate through an 
office, branch, or 
representation office in 




Yes No  No 
Criminalise the 
acceptance of a bribe 
No  Yes No 
Active and passive 
bribery 
Only active Yes Only active 
Different acts from 
bribery 
No No  Yes 
Corrupt intent Yes No  No 
Facilitation payments 
and promotional 




No, although it still poses 
controversies about which 
kind of act is punishable.  
Criminal liability Yes Yes No 
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An individual can be 
fined up to US$250,000 
per violation. For 
companies, fine of up 
to US$2,000,000 per 
violation.  
Unlimited 
Up to 20% of the companies 
gross revenue (the year 
before the opening the 
investigative procedure) or 
up to 60,000,000 reais 
(when it is not possible to 
calculate the gross revenue)  
Other penalties 
An individual may be 







individuals of a 
maximum of 10 years. 
For companies, 
debarment from Public 
Procurement Contracts  
Debarment from Public 
Procurement Contracts. 
Publish the conviction. 
Dissolve a company in 
particularly egregious cases  
Plea Bargaining/Self 
report of corrupting 
practices 
Yes Limited 
Yes, it minimizes the fines 
in 2% 
Though penalties for 
faltering to maintain 
adequate systems of 
internal controls 
Yes Yes 
Yes. Efficient compliance 
mechanism minimizes the 
fines from 1% to 4% 
Who enforces the Act 
Both civil and criminal 
proceedings can be 
brought by DOJ and 
SEC 
Both civil and criminal 
proceedings by Serious 
Fraud Office (SFO) 
The Comptroller General 
Office (CGU) for 
administrative procedures 
in the international sphere. 
I the Federal sphere all 
ministries and also CGU. 
Prosecutor Service can also 
act in courts to civil 
procedures. Every state and 
municipality can also 
enforce the law when it 
involves local civil 
servants. 
Sources: FCPA, UK Bribery Act, Law 12846/2012, Decree 8420/2015; CGU, Transparency International 
(http://www.transparency-usa.org/documents/FCPAvsBriberyAct.pdf) 
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Unlike the US FCPA, Table 2 shows that both Brazilian and British acts do not punish 
private to private bribes. In addition, both Brazilian and British ones require no proof of 
top bosses’ knowledge or the intent of any benefits achieved through an illegal act 
against the public administration committed by any employee, even through a 
subsidiary or a subcontractor. Unlike the UK Bribery Act, the Brazilian and the US acts 
do not criminalize the acceptance of a bribe, although Brazil has other laws that do it. 
Moreover, both Brazilian and US ones take on the role of being both an investigator and 
prosecutor with one only agency.	
 Table 2 also helps visualize who should enforce the acts in the three countries. In 
the case of Brazil, they are slightly different from the US and UK acts. To be the enforcer, 
the Comptroller General Office was chosen to coordinate and, in special occasions, to 
conduce administrative investigations in Brazil’s federal sphere. The agency is also 
expected to conduce all the leniency agreements at federal levels as well as all the 
overseas cases.	
 In fact, in Brazil, even in the Federal sphere, the task to investigate companies for 
suspicious or corrupt acts within Brazilian territory is given to the Comptroller General, 
the Prosecutor Service and the Federal Government Attorney General Service and each 
one of the 39 ministries. The Comptroller General officers, however, cannot take cases to 
court. In order to ensure civil sanctions, such as dissolving a company or seizing 
revenue or property, it is expected that the Prosecutor Service, which is an external anti-
corruption agency, or the Federal Government Attorney Service representatives take the 
cases to court. However, it still remains unclear whether and how the administrative 
procedures will be shared with other law enforcement authorities (Zaheer 2014). In 
addition, according to the Act, any local authority in the 27 states as well as in the 5670 
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municipalities in Brazil can enforce the Act, although most of them have hardly any 
internal agencies prepared to enforce any anti-corruption laws.	
 From December 2014 to April 2015, the Comptroller General Office opened 
investigative procedures against 29 companies and registered only five requests of 
leniency agreements being analysed by an already overwhelmed anti-corruption agency 
of the Federal government, which was selected to enforce the new Act in the federal and 
international spheres with no extra budget. None of them reached in any administrative 
outcome though to date. In addition, in May the interim President of Brazil Michel 
Temer decided to disband the Comptroller General Office and created instead the 
Ministry of Accountability, Transparency and Control through an Executive Order (MP 
726/2016). All of the Comptroller General Office’s attributions were transferred to the 
new agency.	
 Created in 2001 and renamed in 2003 with additional tasks, the Comptroller 
General Office is one of the Federal Executive branch internal control agencies. It carries 
out all the public audits, corruption prevention and ombudsman activities as well as 
being responsible for supervising all internal investigations against the government’s 
civil servants. Before announcing his resignation in December 2014, the former minister 
(head of the agency) complained about budget cuts suggesting such cuts has made it 
harder for the agency to fulfil its anti-corruption mission. After the new task regarding 
the CCA, the anti-corruption agency suffered another cut that affected the federal 
administration as a whole. In the case of the anti-corruption agency, the cut per month is 
1.89 million reais ($ 0.7 million).	
 On the other hand, in line with both acts as well as with OECD guidelines, the 
Brazilian act gives weight to generally effective compliance programmes in order to 
minimise sanctions. Unlike either, however, it exceeds the main international 
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frameworks allowing courts to dissolve a company in particularly egregious cases and 
at the same time it does not include the prohibition to sign new contracts while a 
company is being investigated or offering a leniency agreement among its provisions 
(Magalhães 2013).	
 Brazilian legislation also includes other serious and complex fraud issues other 
than bribery. Nevertheless, even inside the Comptroller General Office, there are still 
controversies around which act is punishable, considering that the five topics listed as 
offences on written Law can be considered imprecise. It is not clear, for instance, what 
will be considered ‘undue pecuniary or other undue advantage’ as it says Chapter 2 of 
the Brazilian CCA. In comparison, the US Act does not punish, for instance, facilitation 
payments and promotional expenses such as travel or accommodation costs, in contrary 
to the UK Act that consider them an offence.	
 Although there are some gaps or issues to be addressed, on paper the Brazilian 
CCA attends international demands without being a copy of international frameworks. 
It was customised with its own peculiarities. However, it is not clear yet how it will be 
enforced, especially by state and municipalities agencies.	
 
Convenient accountability: A reaction to intense pressure	
 
Like any new legislation, there was not enough time for the courts to decide on the most 
controversial topics of the CCA. Further regulations and guidelines are also expected to 
be introduced. However, the long and slow process of preparing, designing and 
implementing guidelines around the Act can be seen as a clear sign that Brazil has made 
the obvious choice to not ignore civil society’s claims and neither to rush and improve 
systems that could punish, for instance, the major campaign financers and contractors in 
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the country. This apparent ‘lack of rush’ might be understood as an attempt to adopt the 
less controlled systems under the rulers perspective, at least in the short term.	
 There is a real concern inside the Federal government around the effects of 
applying a severe punishment, such as the dissolution of companies, as the outcome of 
any current enquires. It is important to note that will be punished only those acts of 
corruption committed after January 2014, when the CCA was officially put into force. As 
mentioned previously, the first targets of Law 12846/2013 are those who offered leniency 
agreements or are already being investigated and have a close relationship with high 
level politicians not only as traditional campaign financers but also because they are 
responsible for the biggest and most important infrastructure contracts in Brazil. 
Therefore, the federal government cannot take any chance to be dysfunctional or to 
place an economy that has already been considered as disappointing in further risk (The 
Economist 2015).	
 When governmental rulers take baby steps to design, approve, enforce and 
regulate a new legislation, they could be, to some extent, calculating all the risks to 
avoid less campaign donations and also massive unemployment and bankruptcy of 
major companies. At the same time, they are taking into account the necessity to take 
action against international constraints and pressure as well as to the peoples’ claims for 
better anti-corruption mechanisms. It is, therefore, a convenient reaction that seems to 
be suitable and as comfortable as possible for those who are in power; it is a 
compressible movement to respond to different kind of pressures. This is labelled here 
as ‘convenient accountability’ and occurs when rulers or state agents do want to avoid 
disappointment among opposing interests and, therefore, take the most convenient 
measures for them. Indeed, it is a decision based on self-interest and is made in order to 
ensure power stability.	
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The suggestion that arises from this study is to apply a rationality perspective to 
both those who have criminal (or corrupt) behaviour and those supposed to enforce 
laws and follow internal rules. Gary Becker in his article ‘Crime and Punishment: an 
economic approach’ (1968) suggests that crime can be seen as a choice based on cost-
benefit analysis in order to maximise profits and minimise losses (De Figueiredo 2012).	
In the case of the Brazilian CCA, this cost-benefit analysis can be identified in 
almost the whole process from the beginning. It important to note that in this specific 
case, the ‘convenient accountability’ concept applies to the attempt to find a balance 
between the expected improvement of Brazil’s horizontal accountability and vertical 
accountability, especially because the accountable target states in the interface between 
the public and the private sectors. Moreover, when horizontal accountability targets 
private companies, as is the case of Law 12846/2013, it is more likely to expect the 
‘convenient accountability’ due to the different kinds of pressure and interests handled 
by rulers who do want to remain in power and want to avoid frustrating the maximum 
number of direct and indirect supporters.	
 Furthermore, as O’Donnell (2004) points out, horizontal accountability happens 
when state institutions act to prevent, redress or punish the presumably illegal actions 
(or inactions) and its degree of efficiency varies across cases and time periods. 
‘Horizontally, in a democratic legal system no state institutions or officers are supposed 
to escape from legal controls regarding the lawfulness of their actions’ (O’Donnell 
2004:37). Although vertical (or electoral) accountability, by definition, exists in a 
democracy (O’Donnell 1998, 1999 and 2004), it is important to note that its weight can be 
affected by the results of both horizontal and societal accountabilities. Electoral results, 
for instance, can be different depending on how a government improves and show the 
results of its anti-corruption agencies. What is here called ‘convenient accountability’ is 
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the perfect point of convergence or the precise weight of O’Donnell’s ideal labels as well 
as of other intermediate categories, such as ‘diagonal’ or ‘oblique’ (Bovens 2007) or 
celestial accountability (Sklar 1999) in order to attend powerholders’ main interests	
 There is evidence that the Law 12846/2013 case was an attempt to create new 
legislation and enforce it to see to the pressure that came from the streets, media and 
ballots without transforming this process into an open crusade against important 
campaigners or private partners. The powerholders, both in the Federal Executive 
branch and in the Legislative, tried to keep the balance among intense pressure. In sum, 
the CCA 15-year process can be seen as a calculated action based on cost and benefit 
analysis that might have resulted in insufficient disincentives for engaging in offences 
such as bribery by companies, but not exactly immediately and possibly neither in a 
short period of time.	
It is essential to highlight that having a specific law does not mean less 
accountability or crime control, especially in countries like Brazil in which some laws 
are famous for not sticking. Correct enforcement followed by real sanctions may be 
considered indispensable. Therefore, more important than the rule of the law is the ‘risk 
of apprehension, the seriousness of the expected punishment, the value of the criminal 
enterprise, and his or her immediate need for criminal gain’ (Siegel 1992:131). ‘Hence, 
crime is more likely to be controlled if, for instance, more law enforcement and 
punishment is applied’ (De Figueiredo 2012:15).	
On the other hand, it is possible to note that until now the main, visible and 
positive outcome of this new law came from some companies that are operating in order 
to improve or create compliance mechanisms (Bottini and Tamasauskas 2014) as a 
preventive act. Indeed, international and local companies are expected by the CCA to 
maintain not only adequate systems of internal controls but also to be ready to self-
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report corrupt practices in order to minimise sanctions in case they are caught.	
As Nobrega (2014) points out, the new rules, if enforced, can be considered able 
to modify the behaviour of companies involved in corrupt practices. ‘However, for 
effective change in behaviour, the perception that those rules are in fact being applied is 
necessary. Therefore, skilled civil servants as well as appropriate procedures and 
punishments along with low reversibility of administrative decisions in the judicial 




Until now, there have been no clear signs that would allow us to predict the real 
outcomes of the enforcement in the federal and (even less) in the local spheres. Future 
studies should look for evidence to show whether ‘convenient accountability’ could 
affect the decision of opening new enquiries and punishing companies as well as how 
long already opened procedures are taking to be completed. At the same time, whether 
another public street demonstration or any international embarrassment could force the 
Comptroller General Office to rush its internal investigation and announce sanctions in 
the near future remains a question which is open to debate.	
 Despite the apparent force of civil society in this case of ‘pressure from below’ 
driving every step of this legislation, no company has yet been punished under Law 
12846/2013. The same ‘lack of rush’ to design and put this law into force can be seen 
during the guideline phase as well as during the initial enforcement phase along with 
the investigative enquires and leniency agreements being conducted slowly. This can be 
seen if compared with the outcomes of Lava Jato investigation conducted by the Federal 
Police, Prosecutor Service and the federal judiciary.	
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In addition, before concluding the ongoing investigations, however, the Federal 
Executive preferred to change the Law in order to attend some companies’ demands, 
especially to allow them to sign contracts with the public service after signing leniency 
agreements. The provisional Executive Order 703/2015 has the full force of Law for 90 
days and, then, it needs to be validated by the National Congress. There are already 
attempts to make amendments in order to directly connect the anti-corruption Law to 
other anti-corruption agencies in the Brazilian multi-institutional accountability system 
such as the prosecutor service and the account court (De Figueiredo 2016).	
 In conclusion, how anti-corruption laws are designed and put into force matters 
and affects their enforcement, especially in countries such as Brazil where political-will 
is affected by the inevitable pressure of those who do not want greater control 
mechanisms. Hence, Brazil’s Clean Company Act can be considered nothing else but an 
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